JinkoSolar’s Transformation: A Major Shift in Leadership Before Annual Report Amidst the Photovoltaic Industry’s Challenges
In March 2025, JinkoSolar underwent a significant reshuffle in its core management team. Wu Tingdong, the former Vice President and Secretary of the Board, resigned due to internal restructuring needs. Qin Shilong, who previously held the same positions at TCL Zhonghuan, stepped in to take over. This leadership change coincides with the company’s critical phase of preparing for its Hong Kong IPO and disclosing its annual report, reflecting JinkoSolar’s efforts to navigate the downturn in the photovoltaic sector through internal adjustments and strategic transformation.
At the same time, the Jin family has reinforced its control through equity distribution, with young executives now making up 67% of the management team. However, the imbalance between supply and demand in the industry, along with plummeting prices, has led JinkoSolar to anticipate a loss exceeding 4.5 billion yuan in 2024. Balancing family governance with market-oriented reforms will be crucial for the company’s survival.
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1. Leadership Changes: Veteran Departure and New Leadership Ahead of the Hong Kong IPO
On April 25, JinkoSolar is set to release its 2024 annual report. However, a pivotal management shift occurred on March 10, 2025, when Wu Tingdong voluntarily stepped down from both of his roles. He may continue to serve as a vice president responsible for new business segments. On the same day, the board swiftly appointed Qin Shilong as the new Secretary of the Board.
For those familiar with the photovoltaic industry, the name Qin Shilong may ring a bell. Born in 1986, this professional manager has experience in asset management and legal affairs and has served as the Secretary of the Board for listed companies, earning a spot in the New Fortune Golden Secretary Hall of Fame. His career in the new energy sector began in 2012 when he joined the predecessor of TCL Zhonghuan, and he rose to the position of Vice President and Secretary of the Board by November 2024.
JinkoSolar’s financial performance in the first three quarters of 2024 showed total revenue of 54.348 billion yuan, representing a 9.39% decline year-on-year. This marked the company’s first net loss since 2016, totaling 857 million yuan. The earnings forecast for 2024 suggests losses between 4.5 billion and 5.2 billion yuan, shocking investors. In February 2025, JinkoSolar announced its plans for a Hong Kong IPO, intending to raise funds through H-share issuance to support overseas capacity expansion and improve cash flow. With this being the company’s third attempt at going public, Qin faces the pressing challenge of unifying the team and managing pressures from financing and price wars.
Apart from the Secretary change, JinkoSolar’s executive team is increasingly youthful. Among the company’s “top management,” the employee representative supervisor Li Binbin is only 29, while supervisors Li Jing and Tao Ran are 34 and 38, respectively. The newly appointed Secretary Qin is 39. Since 2022, JinkoSolar has been gradually replacing its original core management with younger family members and external professional managers. By March 2025, notable figures such as Niu Xinwei and Huang Xinming have left the board, with only Li Shaohui remaining.
The transition to the next generation is progressing steadily. Currently, JinkoSolar’s largest shareholder, Jingtai Fu Technology, holds 47.45% of the shares, with Jin Baofang controlling 51%, while his daughters Jin Junhui and Jin Junmiao hold 24% and 25%, respectively. The first daughter, Jin Junhui, serves as a director, while the second daughter’s husband, Tao Ran, is a director and vice president. However, balancing family control with market governance remains a significant challenge as the company navigates through its leadership transition.
2. Facing Massive Losses: Can Overseas Expansion Provide Relief?
The anticipated losses between 4.5 billion and 5.2 billion yuan place JinkoSolar among the top photovoltaic companies facing losses. The company cited several reasons for this significant forecast: a sharp decline in the prices of major products, a challenging international trade environment, and impairment tests on long-term assets showing signs of decline. In short, the overseas market has cooled.
Whether pursuing an IPO in Hong Kong or changing its Secretary, JinkoSolar’s primary goal is to revitalize its overseas market, recover from substantial losses, and alleviate financial pressure. By the first half of 2024, overseas market revenue accounted for 61.45% of the total revenue, with a gross margin of 13.46% from international operations, compared to a negative -11.32% from domestic business. Amidst the domestic price war, expanding into overseas markets has become a consensus among major enterprises. Since 2023, companies such as Trina Solar, GCL-Poly, LONGi Green Energy, and others have been expanding their overseas production capacities.
As of mid-2024, JinkoSolar has established 13 overseas sales offices, creating a network that stretches across 165 countries and regions. On November 21, 2024, an MOU was signed with Global South Utilities in Egypt and the UAE to build two solar power plants. JinkoSolar is also developing bases in Vietnam, Malaysia, and a factory in Arizona, USA, aiming to create an industrial cluster that promotes localized and international development.
However, the second-largest photovoltaic market, the USA, is imposing increased tariffs on Chinese companies. The US has also closed pathways for tariff exemptions on photovoltaic production in Southeast Asia, and a new round of anti-dumping investigations is underway. Building factories overseas does not guarantee the avoidance of trade risks, but it does increase pressure on the company’s financial chain. By the end of the third quarter of 2024, JinkoSolar’s fixed assets and construction in progress totaled 48.418 billion yuan, a more than fourfold increase compared to 11.43 billion yuan in 2019. The company’s Oman project is also set to begin construction in 2025, with an estimated total investment of 3.957 billion yuan.
Due to the expansion of production capacity and business scale, JinkoSolar’s debt-to-asset ratio rose from 58.3% at the end of 2022 to 72.2% by September 2024. The company is now caught in a growth trap. Given the massive losses, high debt, and cooling overseas market, how will management respond to reverse the downward trend?
3. The Downturn Cycle in Photovoltaics: Profitability Challenges and Solutions
As 2025 begins, JinkoSolar’s leadership changes are not an isolated incident but indicative of broader transformations within the photovoltaic industry facing a downturn. Since 2023, the entire photovoltaic supply chain has been experiencing severe mismatches in capacity and demand, adversely affecting all sectors, including auxiliary materials. According to the China Photovoltaic Industry Association (CPIA), as of October 2024, the production capacity growth rates for silicon materials, wafers, solar cells, and modules were 42%, 33%, 25%, and 21%, respectively. In contrast, silicon material prices dropped over 35%, wafer prices fell over 45%, and cell and module prices decreased by over 25%, resulting in a staggering 43.17% decline in manufacturing output value (excluding inverters).
Wu Tingdong previously noted that product prices have been continuously falling, with module prices now around one-third of what they were at the same time last year. Many products are selling below cost, leading to widespread losses across the supply chain, and resulting in production line shutdowns, project delays, and terminations. The photovoltaic industry, which experienced growth rates of 40% to 50% per year in previous years, is now projected to see growth rates of only 10% to 20% over the next 3-5 years. While the industry is rapidly expanding, market consolidation is intensifying.
In the first half of 2024, JinkoSolar’s solar module business contributed 94.55% of its revenue, but the gross margin was only 4.53%, significantly lower than comparable companies in the industry. JinkoSolar’s peers, such as JA Solar and Trina Solar, reported gross margins of 8.67% and 11.13%, respectively, during the same period. Although LONGi Green Energy has not disclosed its current margin data, it reported losses of 6.505 billion yuan in the first three quarters. Consequently, due to intensified industry fluctuations and continuous price drops, JinkoSolar’s overall profitability is facing significant pressure.
4. Conclusion
JinkoSolar’s restructuring reflects the struggles of major players in the photovoltaic industry as they seek to survive in a challenging environment. From leadership changes to organizational rejuvenation, and from family succession to strategic IPO plans, every move is in tune with the industry’s cyclical nature. However, successful implementation of strategies will require confronting dual challenges: externally, maintaining market share amidst price wars and excess capacity; internally, finding a balance between family control and the empowerment of professional managers. Looking ahead, the progress of its Hong Kong fundraising, production efficiency, and the dynamics within the Jin family will be crucial indicators of whether JinkoSolar can turn the tide. The ongoing reshuffling in the photovoltaic sector may just be the beginning of a long battle.
